Venezuela: What’s Next?

Following the capture and extradition of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by U.S. soldiers under the command of President Donald Trump, Natixis CIB’s Benito Berber – Chief Economist, Americas, Bernard Dahdah – Metals & Mining Analyst, Joel Hancock – Energy Analyst, and Christopher Hodge – Head US Economist, hosted a webinar to discuss the developments and impacts on shifting geopolitical priorities, fragile internal dynamics and complex market reactions across oil and commodities.

The capture of Venezuela’s sitting leader raises questions under international and U.S. law. Under international law, the head of a recognized government is understood to enjoy immunity, and an apprehension in a third country without host-state consent is treated as the use of force rather than law enforcement. It's debated whether the action was legal under U.S. law, as there was no imminent threat.

However, courts are unlikely to intervene, leaving the issue to political authorities and rendering the legal question largely moot in practice. The broader consequences are expected to be political: foreign policy actions seldom shift U.S. domestic dynamics unless they rapidly generate clear economic gains. If economic performance weakens, involvement in Venezuela risks being framed as “overseas adventurism” at a politically sensitive moment.

The emerging U.S. approach prioritizes economic and commercial interests and places renewed emphasis on the Western Hemisphere. The recent operation was unilateral, highly visible, and focused on access to oil, with less attention paid to legality or international perceptions.

There is also greater comfort with the concept of “spheres of influence,” with the United States asserting leadership in the region. A key challenge going forward will be articulating a justification for action in Venezuela that cannot be generalized elsewhere. The resulting doctrine may become one of the more durable legacies of current policy decisions.

Developments on the ground suggest signs of collaboration from elements of the Venezuelan armed forces, including limited casualties and indications that units were warned ahead of time. The tone of the new president, Delcy Rodríguez, inviting cooperation with the U.S., is consistent with continuity of the Chavista regime rather than regime change.

In the near term, priorities are expected to center on cutting ties with Cuba, Iran and China, halting oil exports to China, and limiting connections with Hezbollah.

Immediate organization of new elections is not a central priority. The main risk lies in internal power struggles among Chavista factions or broader instability that undermines necessary investment in oil infrastructure and production. The coming period will be critical for determining whether internal order can be maintained.

Despite holding the world’s largest crude reserves, Venezuela is currently producing far below historic highs. Near-term expectations of a rapid production rebound were described as unrealistic. Instead, sanctions, logistical constraints, storage limits and political uncertainty point toward heightened disruption risk in the near-term.

Roughly 0.9 million barrels per day of exports are at risk, with shipments already reduced by half. The majority of remaining flows are directed to China, particularly independent refiners attracted by discounted crude. China, however, has alternative supply options and access to strategic reserves. Given current oversupply conditions and Chinese crude procurement patterns, markets can absorb temporary Venezuelan disruptions with minimal upside risk.

Long-term production recovery will rely on commodity prices and very large capital commitments. Venezuelan crude requires costly production, blending and transportation, and tends to trade structurally below Brent due to quality characteristics. Infrastructure degradation is extensive, with older fields shut in and equipment either cannibalized or unusable.

Returning to earlier production levels could require USD 60–70 billion over 7–9 years. Key risks include:

Given price expectations and medium-term demand trends, significant Venezuelan output growth is not assumed within the current forecast horizon.

Venezuela has significant mineral resources, including iron ore, bauxite, nickel, gold, copper, zinc and rare earth elements. However, it is essential to distinguish between geological resources and commercially viable reserves. Current activity is dominated by artisanal operations, many associated with regime-linked groups, with estimated gold production in the range of 50–70 tonnes annually.

Significant expansion into strategic minerals would require:

These enabling conditions are not presently in place, limiting realistic near-term output.

Gold prices initially declined into year-end by around 5%, then rebounded approximately 2–3% in response to recent developments, consistent with typical safe-haven behavior amid geopolitical shocks.

Potential spillover effects differ across the region. Colombia is not viewed as a likely next target given its cooperation with the United States and upcoming elections. In Mexico, attention is focused more on drone activity linked to cartels. Cuba faces heightened vulnerability in the absence of Venezuelan oil support and amid limited backing from Russia.

Even scenarios once thought highly unlikely — such as Greenland — can no longer be dismissed entirely after current developments, though they remain low probability.